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THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: SUGGES-
TIONS FOR MAKING INFORMATION 
AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC 
CHARLES H. KocH, ]R.* 
Free and current information about the operations of the govern-
ment is the keystone of a democracy. Without it, visions of impro-
priety and intrigue lead to mistrust. Without it, conjecture replaces 
knowledge as the basis for electoral decisions. Yet the whole structure 
of the federal bureaucracy sits, seemingly immovable, upon the public 
records of the government. 
Two major congressional efforts have been undertaken to lift this 
mass of bureaucratic diffidence from the public records. The first of 
these efforts was section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 
which was passed in 1946.1 That provision directed agencies to make 
available more information about the law developing within them, but 
left the bureaucrats as the final judge of their own compliance. For 
this reason, section 3 as then worded did not significantly open the 
workings of government even to those directly affected by the adminis-
trative process. Therefore, Congress enacted the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act in 1966.2 Promulgated as an amendment to section 3, it 
was intended to make disclosure the rule - permitting records to be 
withheld only if they fell within one of nine exemptions.8 
* Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, Federal Trade Commission; B.A., 
1966, University of Maryland; J.D., 1969, George Washington University. 
1. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237. The Federal Administrative 
Procedure Act (the "APA") was passed for the purpose of establishing uniform 
standards and procedures for the activities of all administrative agencies. Section 3 
of the AP A was the public information section. 
2. Act of July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250, as amended, Act of 
June 5, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54, amending Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, 
60 Stat. 237 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970)). The Freedom of Information Act 
was enacted July 4, 1966, to become effective July 4, 1967. The codification contained 
some changes in the internal structure from the original enactment. 
3. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970). 
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The Act provides for judicial review of agency denial of access 
to identifiable records; it also specifically requires the agency to bear 
the burden of justifying the denial. Furthermore, it empowers the 
courts to enjoin agencies from wrongfully withholding records.4 
However, more than added effectiveness separates the Act from 
the original section 3, for Congress held out the hope with its enact-
ment that ·the mechanisms of this democratic government would be-
come visible. Congress intended the Act to provide the means by 
which the electorate could obtain meaningful information with which 
to judge the performance of those operating the government. Thus, 
while consideration of the original section 3 focused upon the law-
making function of each agency, in the contemplation of the new legis-
lation the emphasis was placed on the right of the public to know how 
the government was performing. Unfortunately, despite this clear in-
tent, utilization of the Act has been limited to providing those directly 
involved in the administrative process with some means of obtaining 
the information necessary to protect their special interests. The failure 
of the Act to accomplish its goal stems more from congressional mis-
direction and ad hoc interpretations by the courts than from conscious 
efforts by the bureaucracy. 
This article will seek out interpretations of the Act which will 
transcend the needs of individual applicants and provide effective ways 
to open the government both to parties involved in its proceedings and 
to the electorate. In addition, the article will venture more ambitious 
revisions, less closely related to the present Act, which should imple-
ment the goals of a public information system. 5 
l. DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A 
PUBLIC INFORMATION SYSTEM 
The 1930's saw an increase in the breadth of activities performed 
by administrative agencies which was so great that it became necessary 
to investigate possible procedures for controlling these activities. Of 
4. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (1970). 
5. The Act has already been the subject of some very learned critiques. Chief 
among them is the prophetic work by Professor Davis following on the heels of its 
enactment. See Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Anal}•sis, 34 U. CHI. 
L. REv. 761 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Davis]. See also Giannella, Agency Pro-
cedures Implementing the Freedom of Information Act: A Proposal for Unfair 
Regulations, 23 An. L. REv. 217 (1970) [report prepared for the Administrative 
Conference of the United States; hereinafter cited as Giannella] ; Katz, The Games 
Bureaucrats Play: Hide and Seek Under the Freedom of Information Act, 48 TEXAS 
L. REv. 1261 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Katz]. 
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primary concern was the secrecy with which agencies could operate. In 
1935, Congress enacted the Federal Register Act6 to provide for publi-
cation of administrative regulation in the same manner as other laws. 
Late in the decade, President Roosevelt appointed a blue ribbon 
committee headed by the Attorney GeneraF to develop procedures for 
the administrative agencies.8 This committee found that one necessary 
reform was the elimination of the secrecy with which law was being 
created by federal agencies. The Committee stated that " [a] n im-
portant and far-reaching defect in the field of administrative law has 
been simple lack of adequate public information concerning its sub-
stance and procedure."9 The Committee pointed to the na:tural distrust 
for secret government decision making as a major source of the criti-
cism of the administrative process.10 Although it praised the Federal 
Register Act, it proposed even broader disclosure of the law created 
in varied forms within the federal government. Its recommended legis-
lation would have required the publication of policies and interpreta-
tions, and the promulgation of rules for making materials available to 
the public.11 
6. 44 U.S.C. § 15Cu (1970) (originally enacted as Act of July 26, 1935, ch. 417, 
49 Stat. 500). 
7. On February 24, 1939, Attorney General Murphy, at the direction of the 
President, appointed "The Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Pro-
cedure" to investigate the need for procedural reform in the various administrative 
tribunals and to suggest improvements in administrative procedure. The Report of the 
Committee was transmitted to the Senate on January 29, 1941. ATTORNEY GENERAL's 
CoMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, REPORT, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN 
GovERNMENT AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 213 (1941) [hereinafter 
cited as ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT]. 
8. SENATE CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 245 (1946) [hereinafter cited as 
APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. 
!d. 
9. ATTORNEY GENERAL's REPORT, supra note 7, at 25. 
10. The report stated: 
Such a state of affairs will at least partially explain a number of types of criticisms 
of the administrative process. VV'here necessary information must be secured 
through oral discussion or inquiry, it is natural that parties should complain of 
'a government of men.' Where public regulation is not adequately expressed in 
rules, complaints regarding 'unrestrained delegation of legislative authority' are 
aggravated. Where the process of decision is not clearly outlined, charges of 'star-
chamber proceedings' may be anticipated. Where the basic outlines of a fair hear-
ing are not affirmatively set forth in procedural rules, parties are less likely to feel 
assured that opportunity for such a hearing is afforded. Much has been done in 
recent years to alleviate these difficulties. But much more can readily be done by 
the agencies themselves. 
11. ld. at 195. 
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Although the majority report of the Committee seemed to focus 
its efforts upon exposing secret law, the minority report developed a 
position more sensitive to the needs of the democratic system for in-
formation concerning the interworkings of the government. Its recom-
mendation for a public information section was that "matters of record 
shall be made available to all interested persons," except that "personal 
data" which the agency finds based upon good cause and statutory 
authorization should be treated as confidential.12 The key words are 
"interested persons;" the use of the phrase " [ t] he press and other 
interested persons"13 indicates that the term "interested persons" was 
to be given a broad meaning intended to open access to others besides 
those directly affected by a specific agency decision. 
Section 3 of the APA 
Final action on the original AP A proposals was delayed by the 
Second World War. When Congress returned to reforming the 
administrative process, the public information section was again con-
sidered to be of great importance. However, a change in emphasis 
appeared in the legislative comments on the value and purpose of the 
public information section. At this point, Congress seemed more con-
cerned with opening the workings of the government to the electorate 
in general than it had been previously.U Despite this concern, the 
public information system finally adopted, section 3 of the AP A, pro-
12. Id. at 221. The minority proposal also permitted agencies to withhold 
"publicity ... during the preliminary or investigative phases of adjudication." Id. 
13. Id. 
14. The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee stated: 
The public information requirements of section 3 are in many ways among the 
most important, far-reaching and useful provisions of the bill. . . . [T] hese pro-
visions require agencies to take the mystery out of administrative procedures by 
stating it. The section has been drawn upon the theory that administrative opera-
tions and procedures are public property which the general public, rather than 
a few specialists or lobbyists, is entitled to know or to have the ready means of 
knowing with definiteness and assurance. 
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, 
S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1945) (emphasis added). The report of the 
House Judiciary Committee stated: 
The public-information provisions of section 3 are of the broadest application 
because, while some functions and some operations may not lend themselves to 
formal procedure, all administrative operations should as a matter of policy be 
disclosed to the public except as secrecy may obviously be required or only in-
ternal agency 'housekeeping' arrangements may be involved. 
HousE CoMM. ON THE JuDICIARY, REPORT oN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT, 
H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1946). 
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vided a method of disclosure only for those persons properly and 
directly affected by the agency action.15 
Proposals to amend section 3 appeared soon after enactment of 
the AP A. These proposals were precipitated by the realization that 
section 3 had not become a disclosure provision, but rather a statu-
tory excuse for withholding government records.16 Section 3 per-
mitted numerous excuses for nondisclosure. Agencies could withhold 
information if secrecy was required "in the public interest" or if the 
records related "solely to the internal management of an agency." 
Information could also be held confidential "for good cause found," 
and even where no good cause could be found for secrecy or confiden-
tiality the records were available only to persons "properly and directly 
concerned." These broad phrases were not defined in the section nor 
15. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 237. Section 3 provided: 
Except to the extent that there is involved (1) any function of the United States 
requiring secrecy in the public interest or (2) any matter relating solely to the 
internal management of an agency-
(a) RuLES. - Every agency shall separately state and currently publish in 
the Federal Register ( 1) descriptions of its central and field organization in-
cluding delegations by the agency of final authority and the established places at 
which, and methods whereby the public may secure information or make submittals 
or requests; (2) statements of the general course and method by which its func-
tions are channeled and determined, including the nature and requirements of all 
formal or informal procedures available as well as forms and instructions as to 
the scope and contents of all papers, reports, or examinations; and (3) substan-
tive rules adopted as authorized by law and statements of general policy or 
interpretations formulated and adopted by the agency for the guidance of the 
public, but not rules addressed and served upon named person in accordance with 
law. No person shall in any manner be required to resort to organization or pro-
cedure not so published. 
(b) OPINIONS AND ORDERS. - Every agency shall publish or, in accordance 
with published rule, make available to public inspection all final opinions or orders 
in the adjudication of cases (except those required for good cause to be held con-
fidential and not cited as precedent) and all rules. 
(c) PuBLIC RECORDS. - Save as otherwise required by statute, matters of 
official record shall in accordance with published rule be made available to persons 
properly and directly concerned except information held confidential for good 
cause found. (emphasis added) 
16. "Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act •.. though titled 'Public 
Information' and clearly intended for that purpose, has been used as an authority for 
withholding, rather than disclosing, information. Such a 180• turn was easy to accom-
plish given the broad language of [Section 3]." HousE CoMM. ON GovERNMENT 
OPERATIONS, CLARIFYING AND PROTECTING THE RIGHT OF THE PUBLIC TO INFORMATION, 
H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 ( 1966) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. 
No. 1497). See also ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE PUBLIC INFORMATION 
SECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT (1967), reprinted in 20 AD. L. REV. 
263 (1963) (hereinafter cited as ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, page references 
to the An. L. REv.]. 
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in its legislative history. 17 There was no provision for review of an 
agency's wrongful denial of access to the records. In sum, section 3 
was a public information statute only to the extent agencies desired 
that it be, and they didn't. 18 
Freedom of Information Act 
The failure of section 3 to provide access to government records 
even to those directly affected by agency action resulted in the con-
gressional effort which culminated in the Freedom of Information Act. 19 
One of the key changes was to require disclosure of all information in 
government records not specifically defined in the nine exemptions.20 
Hence, it is said that the Act was intended as a disclosure statute, not 
a withholding statute.21 
The new legislation established a review procedure which pro-
vides judicial enforcement of the disclosure policy established by 
Congress. The district courts were authorized to grant de novo review 
of denials of access to records and empowered to enjoin agencies from 
improper denials. The agencies were required to bear the burden of 
17. See Bennett, The Freedom of Information Act, is it a Clear Public Record 
Law?, 34 BROOKLYN L. REV. 72, 73 (1967). 
18. The intent of Congress was clearly to direct agencies to make more informa-
tion available : "The public information section is basic, because it requires agencies 
to take the initiative in informing the public." AP A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra 
note 8, at 251. Congress apparently felt that their direction would be enough. Of 
course, the bureaucracy virtually ignored the public information section. Sherwood, 
The Freedom of Information Act: A Compendium for the Military Lawyer, 52 
MILITARY L. REv. 103, 104 (1971). 
19. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970). See generally 80 HARV. L. REv. 909 (1967). 
20. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970) sets forth the nine exemptions as follows: 
(1) matters specifically required by Executive Order to be kept secret in 
the interest of the national defense or foreign policy ; 
(2) matters related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of 
an agency; 
(3) matters specifically exempted by statute; 
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from 
a person and privileged or confidential; 
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums; 
(6) personnel and medical files, the disclosure of which would constitute a 
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; 
(7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes; 
(8) matters contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition 
reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency respon-
sible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions ; 
(9) geological and geophysical information and data. 
21. Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 679 (D.C. Cir.), application for stay denied, 
404 U.S. 1204 (1971); See Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
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showing that denials were "specifically" permitted by one of the nine 
exemptions. 22 
In the most important change, however, access to government 
records was broadened under the Act by permitting "any person" to 
request government records, rather than only those persons "properly 
and directly concerned" as under prior section 3. This change in lan-
guage indicates a shift of emphasis from providing access to citizens 
directly affected by an agency action to establishing a more informed 
electorate - an opening of the bureaucracy to any interested citizen. 
In this new legislative effort the intent was to provide the public 
with ready access to government information. The Senate Judiciary 
Committee found that " [a] lthough the theory of an informed elec-
torate is vital to the proper operation of a democracy, there is nowhere 
in our present law a statute which affirmatively provides for that in-
formation."23 Thus, Congress set out to bring into the open "the 
hundreds of departments, branches, and agencies."24 Looking into 
the full history of the Act, the Second Circuit later found that "the 
ultimate purpose was to enable the public to have sufficient information 
in order to be able, through the electoral process, to make intelligent, 
informed choices with respect to the nature, scope, and procedure of 
federal government activities."25 It is the electoral process and not 
just the administrative process for which the information was to be 
provided. It is the informed electorate as well as the informed party 
to an agency proceeding which occupied the foreground in the Act's 
legislative history. 
The Act and the Informed Electorate 
Although the expressed purpose of the Act was to provide the 
electorate with information, it is not well suited for the task.26 It is, 
22. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (1970). 
23. SENATE COMM. ON THE JuDICIARY, CLARIFYING AND PROTECTING THE RIGHT 
OF THE PUBLIC TO INFORMATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, S. REP. No. 813, 89th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967). 
24. ld. In signing the bill into law, President Johnson stated that "a democracy 
works best when the people have all the information that the security of the nation 
permits." Statement by President Johnson Upon Signing Public Law 89-487 on July 4, 
1966, as reproduced in ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 16, at 263. 
25. Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813, 816 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 125 
(1972). The court stated: "[F]or the great majority of different records, the public 
as a whole has a right to know what its Government is doing." 460 F.2d at 816, 
quoting S. REP. No. 813, supra note 23, at 5-6 (emphasis added by the court). 
26. The Act is universally considered to be the product of poor draftsmanship. 
Professor Davis announced .on the heels of its enactment: "The Act is difficult to 
196 MARYLAND LAw REVIEW [VoL. XXXII 
of course, unrealistic to suppose that citizens in general will have the 
interest or the time to examine agency records to make themselves 
better informed voters. But two groups who digest information for 
mass consumption, researchers and the media, have not been suffi-
ciently accommodated by the Act. 
Researchers 
A study reported by Ralph Nader found that "most agencies have 
a two-pronged information policy - one towards citizens and one to-
wards the special interest groups that form the agency's regulated 
constituency."27 A survey conducted by the Administrative Confer-
ence28 generally supports the conclusions of the Nader study. 29 This 
bias, however, is not the result of a conspiracy between special interests 
and the agencies but is rather the natural result of the Act. 
Reliance on judicial enforcement is one reason for this bias. 
Judicial review is more realistically available to agency clientele than 
to most researchers. There is usually a tangible benefit in compelling 
disclosure to a party in an agency proceeding. Hence, the possibility 
of court action by a disappointed member of an agency's clientele is 
far greater than that of action by a disappointed private citizen en-
gaged in research. 
In addition, compliance with the Act requires considerable re-
·source allocation. Because the Act permits some documents to be 
withheld, and because most agency statutes or rules require certain 
-documents to be confidential, a large amount of staff resources must 
be committed to the segregation of documents before release. Agency 
officials are understandably reluctant to commit resources to such tasks. 
They become more reluctant where the request is not directly related 
interpret, and in some respects it is badly drafted." Davis, supra note 5, at 761. 
Although courts have differed in interpretation, they have agreed, if sometimes im-
plicitly, with Davis' observations: "Unquestionably the Act is awkwardly drawn." 
Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930, 932 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970). 
·"The Information Act leaves a good many things not clearly defined." Nichols v. 
United States, 325 F. Supp. 130, 138 (D. Kan. 1971). 
27. Nader, Freedom from Information: The Act and the Agencies, 5 HARV. Crv. 
·RrGHTS-Crv. Lm. L. REv. 1, 2 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Nader]. 
28. The Administrative Conference was created by the Administrative Confer-
-ence Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-76 (1970). It is composed of representatives of the heads 
-of the many administrative agencies who meet to discuss and recommend uniform 
·changes in administrative procedure. See generally Prettyman, Some Broader Aspects 
of an Administrative Conference of the United States, 17 Ao. L. REV. 48 (1964); 
Note, The Administrative Conference Act, 53 GEo. L.J. 457 (1965). 
29. Giannella, supra note 5, at 221. 
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to an agency's function. This problem is aggravated by the fact that 
requests from researchers are generally broader and less exact, and 
hence require significant expenditures of resources. For these reasons, 
student groups engaged in general research, for example, will not find 
agency officials sympathetic to their requests. 
The alleged two-pronged approach is also the result of the belief 
held by most government officials that the Act should not be used for 
"fishing expeditions." The Attorney General's memorandum on the 
Act expressed this view.30 This opinion is not consistent with the 
history and purpose of the Act ; the Act was no doubt intended to assist 
in permitting searching inquiries into the administrative process.31 
However, the absence of direction and advice, except to the limited 
extent provided by judicial review, makes it unlikely that bureaucrats 
will be disabused of this notion. 
For these reasons, the Act often fails to promote disclosure to 
the researchers who in tum might help create a more informed elec-
torate. Only the threat of judicial review by those few researchers 
who have .the capability can force the system to make the Act perform 
this function. 32 
The Media 
More troublesome than the difficulty researchers experience in 
obtaining information is the fact that the media has gained very little 
from the Act despite its contribution to the enactment.33 The media is 
the major conduit through which general information reaches the vast 
majority of the electorate, and therefore it can best provide the electorate 
with quick insight into government operations. Even N ader-type 
research groups must depend on the media to reach the private citizen. 
At a symposium on the Act conducted by the Administrative Law 
Section of the American Bar Association one newspaperman, familiar 
with administrative agencies, testified as to the reasons the media has 
30. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 16, at 292, states: 
The requirement is thus not intended to impose upon agencies an obligation to 
undertake to identify for someone who requests records the particular materials 
he wants where a reasonable description is not afforded. The burden of identifica-
tion is with the member of the public who requests a record, and it seems clear 
that Congress did not intend to authorize 'fishing expeditions.' 
31. Giannella, supra note 5, at 231; Katz, supra note 5, at 1261. 
32. See Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir.), application for stay denied, 
404 u.s. 1204 (1971). 
33. HoUSE COMM. ON GoVERNMENT OPERATIONS, ADMINISTRATION OF THE FREE-
DOM OF INFORMATION AcT, H.R. REP. No. 92-1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1972) ; 
Giannella, supra note 5, at 219. 
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not been a particularly prominent user of the Act. 34 The reporter 
pointed out that the media cannot wait for the grant of access; this is 
a process which takes even the speediest agency time in excess of 
ordinary deadlines. Second, because of the defenses of agencies, the 
media has developed alternate means for obtaining information about 
newsworthy occurrences, despite the fact that this information may 
be less complete and accurate than information from the agencies 
themselves. Third, it is simply bad business for one member of the 
media to invest money in a lawsuit to obtain information which will 
be public knowledge.35 
Therefore, the Act has not provided the electorate with informa-
tion because it has not adequately opened government operations to 
researchers and media. The public information system established 
by the Act fails to take cognizance of the practical problems of per-
mitting access to these two groups of applicants. 
Secret Law 
Although the Act was intended to do more, it has been some-
what successful in dealing with the problem of secrecy in agency law, 
making. Professor Davis, upon passage of the Act, recognized the 
dichotomy between secret law and public information. He prophesied 
this result in his statement: "Although the bar played a minor role in 
getting the Act enacted, members of the bar and their clients will be 
the principal beneficiaries. Unlike the Act's accomplishments in open-
ing up information, its accomplishments in opening up secret law 
are impressive."36 
The diminution of secret lawmaking is brought about by two 
provisions. First, the Act requires an agency to make available for 
public inspection and copying four classes of information : ( 1) "final 
opinions, including concurring and dissenting opinions, as well as 
orders, made in the adjudication of cases;" (2) "those statements of 
34. L. Kohlmeier, Freedom of Information Act and the Agencies, The Journalist's 
Viewpoint, 23 An. L. REv. 129, 143 (1971). Mr. Kohlmeier is a reporter for the Wall 
Street Journal and author of The Regulators: Watchdog Agencies and the Public 
Interest. Accord, Statement of Ward Sinclair, Washington Bureau, Louisville Courier-
Journal, Hearings on U.S. Government Information Policies and Practices- Adminis-
tration and Operation of the Freedom of Information Act Before the Foreign Opera-
tions and Government Information Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government 
Operations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4, at 1279 ( 1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 
Hearings]. 
35. But cf. Statement of John Seigenthaler, Editor, Nashville Tennessean, 1972 
Hearings at 1302; Statement of James Steele, Writer, Philadelphia Inquirer, /d. at 1294. 
36. Davis, supra note 5, at 804. 
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policy and interpretations which have been adopted by the agency 
and are not published in the Federal Register;" ( 3) "administrative 
staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect a member of the 
public;" and ( 4) "a current index providing identifying information 
for the public as to any matter issued, adopted, or promulgated after 
July 4, 1967, and required by this paragraph to be made available or 
published."37 Failure to comply with this provision disables the agency 
from relying on, using or citing as precedent such material unless the 
party has actual notice.38 Thus, decisions and opinions of the agency 
and the affected party now are available to anyone having business 
with the agency. 
Second, secret lawmaking is diminished under the Act by pro-
viding parties with access to agency records. The APA contains no 
provision for pretrial discovery in the administrative process.39 The 
Administrative Conference found that "most federal agencies do not 
provide in their rules for any significant amount of discovery against 
the agency."40 Since the provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure for discovery do not apply to administrative agencies, there 
is a gap with respect to the discovery available in an administrative 
proceeding. Moreover, even those agencies which do provide some 
pretrial discovery techniques in an adjudicative context may not have 
discovery procedures in other types of proceedings, such as rulemaking. 
The major use of the Act to date has been to fill this void and to 
provide new discovery tools where none existed before.U The great 
37. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2) (1970). 
38. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2) (C) (1970) states in part: 
A final order, opinion, statement of policy, interpretation, or staff manual or in-
struction that affects a member of the public may be relied on, used, or cited as 
precedent by an agency against a party ... only if - (i) it has been indexed 
and either made available or published as provided by this paragraph; or (ii) the 
party has actual and timely notice of the terms thereof. 
39. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 8.15 at 588 (1958). 
40. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 8.15 at 392 (Supp. 1970). 
41. One example of the use of the Act as a form of discovery is found in Shakes-
peare Co. v. United States, 389 F.2d 772 (Ct. Ct. 1968), appeal dismissed, 419 F.2d 
839 (Ct. Ct. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 820 (1970). Shakespeare was locked in a 
dispute with the IRS over the amount of excise tax it owed. It sought discovery of 
the private rulings of the IRS. As an alternative approach, Shakespeare claimed that 
access should be granted under the Act. The court found that Shakespeare could not 
obtain discovery under any traditional discovery theory. It dismissed the claim under 
the Act because the records were not relevant to the proceeding and because the docu-
ments were not specifically defined. The relevancy holding is clearly wrong because 
there is no requirement of relevancy under the Act. The holding that the party failed 
to properly define the documents is too restrictive. The restrictive decision probably 
resulted because the court recognized the claim under the Act as just another dis-
covery ploy and wished to avoid giving records under the Act which it found un-
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bulk of access requests received by federal agencies concern requests 
for information to be used by private interests in proceedings before 
the agencies. 42 
It can be predicted that the major use of the Act will continue 
to be by private parties to gain discovery of agency records. Where 
there is no discovery in an agency's adjudicative proceedings, the Act 
'"ill be the only method of gaining access to agency documents. Where 
there are alternatives, a party to an agency proceeding may well have 
a choice of tactics. Parties will certainly attempt to utilize the Act 
as a discovery tool where the information may be or has been held 
to be irrelevant for the purposes of actual discovery.43 It will also 
available under ordinary discovery. Ordinarily, an appellate court will uphold the use 
of the Act for discovery purposes, particularly where no other discovery exists in the 
agency's proceeding. See, e.g., Bannercraft Clothing Co. v. Renegotiation Bd., 466 
F.Zd 345 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
42. Ralph Nader found that from the effective date of the Act to early 1969, there 
were forty cases brought under the Act: "Thirty-seven of these cases involved actions 
by corporations or private parties seeking information relating to personal claims or 
benefits. In only three cases did the suits involve a clear challenge by or for the rights 
of the public at large to information." Nader, supra note 27, at 13. 
Review of the reported cases under the Act to date shows fifty-five cases, 
forty-one of which involve, to some degree, access to records. Of these, thirty-three 
involve corporate or private interests. (The cases brought under the Act which in-
volve validity of a rule under the publication provision are excluded, but they all 
involved private interests). Six cases could be termed public information cases. See 
Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.Zd 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (access to "Excelsior" lists of em-
ployees for the purpose of studying labor elections) ; Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (access to President's Commission Report on the SST); Epstein v. 
Resor, 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970) (access to war 
papers for scholarly study); Skolnick v. Parsons, 397 F.2d 523 (7th Cir. 1968) (access 
to report to the President from the President's Crime Commission) ; Nichols v. 
United States, 325 F. Supp. 130 (D. Kan. 1971) (access to exhibits relating to Kennedy 
assassination); Consumers Union v. Veterans Admin., 301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 
1969) (access to government test data for hearing aids). One would expect the re-
quests to reflect similar ratios. 
43. The use of the Act as a discovery tool may delay an enforcement proceeding 
if the adjudicative proceeding must be suspended by the agencies until all the material 
is supplied. One solution to this problem might be to adopt the doctrine that since 
a request under the Freedom of Information Act is a separate matter from the pend-
ing adjudicatory proceeding the pendency of such a request is not a ground for 
postponing the hearing in the proceeding. However, resort to this remedy may be 
foreclosed as a result of a recent opinion by the District of Columbia Circuit. See 
Bannercraft Clothing Co. v. Renegotiation Bd., 466 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1972), 
affirming the district court's decision to enjoin the proceedings until the request under 
the Act was completed. The court concluded that the Act was intended to mitigate 
the problems of those forced to litigate with agencies on the basis of incomplete in-
formation, and that the parties involved in the proceeding would suffer irreparable 
injury if the proceeding were continued pending completion of the request. But cf. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB, 433 F.2d 210, 211 (6th Cir. 1970) (per curiam). 
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be used in this fashion in nonadjudicative proceedings, such as rule-
making, where the right to discovery against the agency may not exist. 
The access provision of the Act has been largely limited to pro-
viding additional discovery because of inherent weaknesses in the 
congressional approach to implementing a public information policy. 
Knowledge of the agency and the law is almost essential to framing 
a request under the Act. Only special interests have both the incen-
tive and the resources to test denial in the courts; hence, where an 
agency denies a request in the nature of discovery by an affected 
party, the basis for that denial will in all likelihood be tested. Not 
only has this factor led to court opinions and orders limiting agency 
discretion to withhold such records, but bureaucrats have treated re-
quests more generously where the threat of court action exists.44 
In fairness, there is nothing particularly wrong with this result.45 
Indeed, the advantages of a better informed bar outweigh any disad-
See also Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. FTC, CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1f 74.124 
(D.D.C. 1972) (no irreparable injury shown). 
If the Bannercraft opinion is limited to instances in which no other method of 
discovery is available, it is sound and will no doubt have a beneficial result. If it is 
applied to proceedings where discovery against the agency is provided by the agency, 
then this decision will do great damage to agencies' law enforcement efforts, due to 
the delay entailed in halting the proceedings while discovery is conducted. 
44. "The mere threat of ... an action under the act has often released documents 
that have been earlier withheld." Statement of Benny L. Kass, 1972 Hearings, supra 
note 34, at 1414. 
45. However, the increased publication and access might well have been accom-
plished under old section 3 but for the absence of judicial enforcement. Of the four 
classes of documents which must be made available for public inspection, the two most 
important - adjudicative orders and opinions, and statements of policy and interpreta-
tion - could have been available under section 3. Section 3 (b) makes available the 
first class by the language: "All final opinions and orders in the adjudicative cases" 
with an exception which is maintained in the exemption in the Act. The second class, 
statements of policy and interpretation, would also be included in the section 3(b) 
requirement of availability of "all rules." The term "rules" is defined by the AP A 
as "the whole or part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and 
future effect designed to implement, interpret or prescribe law or policy or describing 
the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency." 5 U .S.C. § 551 ( 4) 
(1970). The phrase in the Act - "statement of policy or interpretation" - is no 
more inclusive than this definition. The term "rules" is much broader than the rules 
referred to in the Federal Register provision. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1) (1970). It can 
be assumed that the use of the term in (b) was not intended to be a redundancy and 
hence meant everything included in the definition of rules but not covered by the 
Federal Register provision. In addition, this definition of "rules" might well have been 
held to include the third class of "staff manuals and instruction to staff that affect a 
member of the public." 
The second assault on secret law, the discovery mechanism, CCluld also have 
been developed by judicial enforcement of section 3. Section 3(c) required a grant 
of access to anyone "properly and directly concerned." One who could claim to be 
affected by an agency determination certainly would fall within this definition. Thus, 
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vantages of opening the decisional process to private interests. In 
addition, the efforts of "public interest" attorneys are surely aided 
by the Act because of the likelihood that they would be denied access to 
records more often than the representatives of agency clientele. Any 
resulting diminution in secret lawmaking is desirable even if the process 
remains obscure or unavailable to the general public.46 
Yet, even in this regard, the Act has not been totally effective. 
Access has been incomplete and inequitable. Regular members of the 
agencies' clientele with experienced and specialized counsel have found 
the Act more useful than those with less understanding, resources, 
and in fl. uenceY 
Reasons for Agency Evasion 
Since the effective date of the Act, criticizing the agencies for the 
failures of the Act has been a popular sport.48 The tendency has been 
to impute ill will to bureaucrats for· their reluctance to comply.49 
broad discovery could have resulted under this provision. There are a few exceptions, 
but none of these are any broader than those in the present Act. 
Consequently, had the public information section of the AP A been obeyed, 
little would have been accomplished by an amendment such as the Act in the diminish-
ing secret law. More agency law would have been available for inspection and the 
absence of discovery in some instances would have been cured. If this were the sum 
total of the goal of the Act, an amendment to grant court jurisdiction could have cured 
the problem. 
46. There is a merging of both the secret law and public information problems 
which should be recognized in order to interpret the Act to assist citizens in dealing 
with the government. The Act should be interpreted to require publication of rules 
and interpretations of broad application developed in an individual adjudicative context 
on the same basis as such broadly applicable determinations are now published when 
promulgated in a rulemaking proceeding. Individual adjudicative opinions generally 
contain so much opinion relevant only to the case at hand that broad policy decisions 
are hidden. In British Auto Parts, Inc. v. NLRB, 405 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1968), 
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1012 (1969), a rule promulgated by adjudication was not 
required to be separately published. The right of the agency to make rules in adjudica-
tion, although criticized, has been upheld. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. 759 
(1969). However, it would greatly assist those who are not in continual contact with 
the agency if such rules were separated from the individual opinion and published 
as rules. 
47. H.R. REP. No. 92-1419, supra note 33, at 8. 
48. See, e.g., Giannella, supra note 5; Katz, supra note 5; Nader, supra note 27. 
49. See, e.g., Fellmeth, The Freedom of Information Act and the Federal Trade 
Commission: A Study in Malfeasance, 4 HARV. Crv. RrGHTs-Crv. LrB. L. REV. 345 
(1969); Katz, supra note 5; Statements of Messrs. Robertson, Wellford and Schuck 
for the Center for the Study of Responsive Law, 1972 Hearings, supra note 34, at 1251. 
Indeed, there have been certain allegations of conscious avoidance of the Act which 
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However, an objective reading of the Act leads to the conclusion that 
the poor performance of the agencies is largely the result of inherent 
defects within the Act. 
The significant resource allocation required by the Act for the 
release of information necessarily causes bureaucrats to attempt to 
avoid or mitigate compliance. Providing information to the public is 
a primary task in very few agencies. Public information considerations 
must be balanced in every agency against its primary role, and there is 
no federal agency which envisions itself as having the resources to 
carry out the full extent of its function. In this milieu, public informa-
tion activities find little support.50 
The agencies are left with the difficult task of applying ambiguous 
language in specific circumstances. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
agencies resolve the ambiguities in a way which is most favorable to 
them or which requires the least commitment of resources. The pro-
pensity to withhold documents increases because of the unresolved 
conflict between the disclosure compelled by the Act and the nondis-
closure directed by the specific statutes which control the activities of 
the agency. 51 These conflicts are most easily resolved by withholding 
all documents arguably covered by the specific statutory direction.52 
Unfortunately, the practical problems which the Act creates for agencies 
are largely ignored by the courts. 53 
A significant drain on the administrative process is the inevitable 
result of the present draconian approach of the judiciary. Courts in-
terpret the Act so that agencies must not only review and justify with-
holding each individual document, but are also often required to edit 
documents so that individual portions can be released.54 Although it 
seem so elaborate that it seems improbable that most bureaucrats would actually take 
the trouble. This sort of activity does not seem to be very widespread, and certainly 
is not the cause of a significant amount of the failure to make records available. 
50. See Statement of Robert Beatty, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, De-
partment of Health, Education and Welfare, 1972 Hearings, supra note 34, at 1666-67. 
51. Sherwood, supra note 18, at 119. 
52. See Giannella, supra note 5, at 221. 
53. See Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 24 (4th Cir. 1971). Indicative of this 
attitude is the court's statement: "The Freedom of Information Act was not designed 
to increase administrative efficiency .... " 
54. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
But see Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 41 U.S.L.W. 4201 (U.S. Jan. 
22, 1973), holding that "in camera inspection ... to sift out so-called 'non-secret com-
ponents'" [ 41 U.S.L.W. at 4204] is not permissible where exemption one (documents 
specifically required by Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of defense) 
is concerned. 
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is inconceivable that Congress intended the Act to cripple agencies' 
efforts to fulfill their primary duties,55 courts do not generally consider 
the possibility of that result in their interpretations of the Act. 
The notable exception to the typical myopic judicial decisions is 
Judge Holtzoff's opinion in Bristol-Myers Co. v. Federal Trade Com-
mission. 56 In that case, the applicant requested numerous documents 
compiled in connection with a law enforcement investigation. Judge 
Holtzoff found that the definition of available documents under the 
Act must be susceptible to use by lower level staff so that the release 
of documents constitutes merely a ministerial function. He surmised 
that, if information was to be released to "any person," the mechanics 
for obtaining access could not involve agency officials on a regular 
basis.57 Unfortunately, the D.C. Court of Appeals, in reviewing Judge 
Holtzoff's opinion, found unacceptable anything other than tedious 
review and editing of individual documents. 58 Ignoring the rationale 
of the lower court, the court simply found that the lower court had 
committed error because it had "failed to examine the disputed docu-
ments, and to explain the specific justification for withholding par-
ticular items."59 Thus, the unworkability of the Act has not been 
cured, but instead has been aggravated by the courts. Agencies cer-
tainly need prodding to release information, but there is a difference 
between prodding and the unrealistic compulsions which are now 
imposed upon them. 
55. Giannella, supra note 5, at 234-35. 
56. 284 F. Supp. 745 (D.D.C. 1968), aff'd, 424 F.Zd 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
400 u.s. 824 (1970). 
57. Id. at 747. 
58. Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 
824 (1970). 
59. ld. at 938. It is interesting to note that the judicial approach has also placed 
significant burdens on reviewing courts. In Bristol-Myers the appellate court returned 
the case to the district court for review of all the documents. If every review is to 
necessitate the court reading all the documents, then a significant drain on the already 
overworked judicial system will result. Subsequent to the appellate court's direction 
in Bristol-Myers the district court again refused access without inspecting the docu-
ments. See Irons v. Schuyler, 321 F. Supp. 628 (D.D.C. 1970). The court said: 
This Court is not required to examine every manuscript decision of the past 100 
or more years to decide in each case if there is trade secret or other material 
which should be excluded. The legislative history of the Act indicates that it was 
not the intent of Congress to add materially to the burden of overworked courts. 
ld. at 629. This may be good reading of congressional intent and good sense, but it 
does not appear to be the law. Another possible method of avoiding this overwhelming 
burden is found in the approach of the court in Wechsler v. Shultz, 324 F. Supp. 
1084 (D.D.C. 1971), where the court only inspected samples of the numerous records 
in question. 
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II. MAKING THE AcT WoRK 
The assignment for those who are dissatisfied with implementa-
tion of the Act is not to lay blame but to remold the Act so that 
ready access to government records can be a reality. The primary 
requisite for all interpretations of .the Act must be the practicality 
of implementation, not just in the case at issue, but in relation to every 
potential access request similar to that in the case at issue. 
A major effort to enable agencies to leave compliance in the hands 
of lower level staff is necessary; hence, distinctions cannot be too 
sharply drawn or too complicated. Moreover, it must be possible to 
make categorical decisions as to whether or not to release documents. 
Compliance with the Act breaks down where every document covered 
by a request must be read and edited by members of the agencies' pro-
fessional staff. 
Implementation of the Act must be equitable. Every request must 
stand or fall on the same test. Major resource commitments or nice 
distinctions necessarily lead to a value judgment as to the worth of a 
particular request. The possibility of an enforcement proceeding be-
comes a key factor in such a situation. Finally, the more complicated 
the implementation, the slower access will come. The imposition of 
time limits upon agencies is an easy and unthinking approach to delay 
which is unacceptable. 60 The reasons behind the delay must be ex-
amined and cured. 
The first effort in making the Act work must be made by the 
courts. The courts must take a more practical approach to interpret-
ing the Act. Even though the Act permits exemptions only where 
"specifically stated," its ambiguity gives the courts a broad range of 
discretion in its implementation. Courts have unfortunately followed 
an ad hoc approach. At present, the decision in every case involves a 
balancing of the equities of the parties before the court. The Act will 
become a public information statute only if the courts take a prag-
matic look into the agencies' recordkeeping and limit themselves to 
broad pronouncements as to the categories of information which must 
be released. 
The two statutory exemptions which have raised the most ques-
tions are investigatory files and internal documents. These exemptions 
are particularly susceptible to practical interpretation. Perhaps this 
susceptibility is a result of the fact that they grew out of concern for 
the continued functioning of the agencies without significant interfer-
60. H.R. REP. No. 92-1419, supra note 33, at 83. 
206 MARYLAND LAw REVIEW [VoL. XXXII 
ence from the Act. 61 Suggested below are interpretations which both 
offer more public information and deal realistically with agencies' 
problems in releasing these types of records. 
Investigatory Files 
Exemption seven, 62 the investigatory file exemption, has been one 
of the most controversial. This exemption protects from disclosure 
investigatory files compiled by the agency for the purpose of pursuing 
its law enforcement functions, whether civil or criminal. By the in-
clusion of the phrase "except to the extent available by law to a private 
party," Congress intended to foreclose use of the exemption to deny 
access to documents which otherwise have been made available by 
Congress and the courts, such as Jencks Act statements.63 The ex-
emption's purpose is to assure that the Act does not intt'rfere with 
the law enforcement responsibilities of the agencies. 
The language of the exemption seems to create a blanket 
exemption for any records compiled for law enforcement purposes, 
and some courts have so read it.64 However, the fact situations pre-
sented to the courts have compelled them to legislate some limitations. 
The courts now stand at the crossroads between two related interpre-
tations of the investigatory file exemption. One interpretation requires 
61. See Note, Freedom of Information: the Statute and the Regulation, 56 GEo. 
L.]. 18, 39-40, 47 (1967). 
62. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970); "This section does not apply to matters that 
are ... (7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the 
extent available by law to a party other than an agency .... " 
63. The Attorney General interpreted 5 U.S.C. § 552(h) (1970) as follows: 
The effect of the language in exemption (7) ... seems to be to confirm the 
availability to litigants of documents from investigatory files to the extent to 
which Congress and the courts have made them available to such litigants. For 
example, litigants who meet the burdens of the Jencks statute (18 U.S.C. 3500 
[1970]) may obtain prior statements given to an FBI agent or an SEC investi-
gator by a witness who is testifying in a pending case; but since such statements 
might contain information unfairly damaging to the litigant or other person, the 
new law, like the Jencks statute, does not permit the statement to be made avail-
able to the public. 
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 16, at 307. The Jencks statute was 
enacted in response to the Supreme Court's grant of access to government witness 
interview reports in Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). For an interpreta-
tion of the statute see Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959). 
64. In Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. dmied, 93 S. Ct. 125 (1972), 
the court found that the exemption was indeed unlimited. It read the legislative history 
as expressing a congressional intent that any investigatory file compiled for law en-
forcement purposes is exempt forever. Accord, Cowles Communication, Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Justice, 325 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Cal. 1971), holding that "'investigatory Iiles 
compiled for law enforcement purposes' need not be produced whether proceedings be 
contemplated or not." 325 F. Supp. at 727. 
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release of files when they are no longer current, or for some other 
reason have ceased to be useful for law enforcement purposes; the 
other requires release of that portion of the records, whether inactive 
or current, that will not prematurely disclose the government's case. 
While one of these interpretations is workable, the other has the 
potential effect of interfering with the administrative process. 
In Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding and Drydock Co.,65 one of the 
earliest opinions to interpret the exemption, the court was faced with 
a fact situation which compelled it to limit the exemption. Plaintiff 
sought production of a report of an accident, which resulted in the 
death of plaintiff's decedent, prepared immediately after the accident 
by an investigator for the Department of Labor. The law enforce-
ment file containing the report was four and a half years old, and no 
longer useful to the government for law enforcement. The court 
limited the exemption by looking beyond the language of the Act to 
the legislative purpose. The primary purpose, it found, was to avoid 
premature disclosure of the government's case in a law enforcement 
proceeding. Because the records were not only old but had served 
their public purpose, the court held that the purpose of the exemption 
was not furthered by applying it to these documents. 
Bristol-Myers Co. v. Federal Trade Commission66 suggested a 
similar limitation to the exemption. There the Federal Trade Com-
mission sought to protect documents relevant to a rulemaking pro-
ceeding involving the analgesic drug industry. The Federal Trade 
Commission had originally compiled the documents for the purpose of 
possible cease and desist proceedings, but later decided to deal with 
the problem by an industrywide rulemaking proceeding. The docu-
ments sought were old and the original law enforcement purpose no 
longer existed. Therefore, the court found that the danger of pre-
mature disclosure was not present since no real concrete possibility of 
an adjudicative proceeding existed. It stated that the test was whether 
the possibility of adjudication was so unlikely that the records could 
not be said to be a law enforcement file. 67 
Although these cases involve files which were found to be no 
longer "law enforcement," the underlying "premature disclosure" 
rationale has been broadened to include current files. In Wellford 
v. Hardin,68 the district court, citing both Cooney and Bristol-Myers, 
found that the test was not whether the file was still a law enforcement 
65. 288 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1968). 
66. 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970). 
67. ld. at 939. 
68. 315 F. Supp. 175 (D. Md. 1970), ajj'd, 444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971). 
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file, but whether portions of the records sought from an investigatory 
file might prematurely disclose the government's case. Plaintiff sought 
four categories of documents from the Department of Agriculture : 
letters of warning sent to nonfederally inspected meat or poultry 
processors; information relating to detention of meat and poultry 
products; biweekly reports of the Director of Slaughter Inspection 
Division; and minutes of meetings of the National Food Inspection 
Advisory Committee. The court postponed consideration of the last 
two categories.69 Finding that the first two categories of documents 
were already in the possession of the potential party to any proceed-
ing, the court held that release could not result in premature disclosure 
of the government's case. The appellate court upheld the district court 
and agreed with its use of the "premature disclosure" rationale. 70 
The expansion of the "premature disclosure" rationale by Well-
ford is extremely impractical. Agencies may automatically release 
files when they are not current or for some other reason have ceased 
being useful for law enforcement purposes. But agencies cannot rea-
sonably be expected to release documents contained in a working law 
enforcement file. Constant searches through law enforcement files 
would place an impossible burden on the law enforcement resources of 
every agency. More onerous is the prospect that after each new re-
lease of information to a party, such as pretrial conference, new docu-
ments would fall into the disclosable category by operation of their 
disclosure to respondent. Thus, constant new releases would be neces-
sary throughout the law enforcement proceeding. 
The premature disclosure reasoning is not only impractical to 
administer, but it is.also not good law. The sole basis for the rationale 
is one sentence of the history of the exemption which reads: "The 
Act is not intended to give a private party indirectly any earlier or 
greater access to investigatory files than he would have directly in 
such litigation or proceeding."71 To glean from this sentence the 
conclusion that premature disclosure was the only interference from 
which Congress intended to protect agency law enforcement seems 
somewhat intuitive. This sentence, in context, suggests one of the 
69. 315 F. Supp. 179. Upon reconsideration the court decided not to examine the 
biweekly reports and the minutes, determining that they were exempt under exemp-
tion five. 
70. Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971). However, the court limited 
reliance on a premature disclosure rationale by its finding that the requested materials 
were not part of an investigatory file because they were the results of agency action 
which should have been released as such. 444 F.2d at 24. 
71. H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 16, at 11; see Wellford v. Hardin, 315 F. 
Supp. 175, 177 (D. Md. 1970). 
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ways Congress did not wish the exemption to be used.72 This lan-
guage should not be read to indicate Congress' intent to limit the 
exemption solely to premature disclosure.73 
Courts have recognized that the exemption was intended to as-
sure that the Act was not used to interfere with law enforcement 
functions. 74 Although it is perhaps a better reading of both the lan-
guage and the history of the Act to conclude that the exemption is 
blanket,75 it is clear that, at the very least, no grant of access was 
intended where it might in any way interfere with law enforcement. 
The need for some limitation on the exemption is evident.76 A 
workable limitation is the test set down by the District of Columbia 
Circuit in Bristol-Myers: "Thus the District Court must determine 
whether the prospect of enforcement proceedings is concrete enough 
to bring into operation the exemption for investigatory files, and if 
so whether the particular documents sought by the company are never-
theless discoverable.1177 If a file is currently active then it should be 
given blanket protection. But if it has passed its usefulness, then it 
should be open to the public, excepting those records protected by 
another exemption. This "currently active" limitation has been found 
to comport with legislative intent in creating the exemption.78 Such 
a limitation would be practical. It would permit the agencies undis-
turbed use of the working files while freeing the information in them 
when they are no longer serviceable to the agency. 
72. In Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708, 711 (E.D. 
Pa. 1968), the court found "a primary purpose" was to prevent premature disclosure. 
It did not suggest that it was the only purpose. 
73. Indeed, in Benson v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 1144, 1146 (D. Neb. 1970), 
the court relied on the very same sentence of the House Report to reach an opposite 
conclusion. 
74. The courts have tended to be sympathetic to agencies' legitimate need to pro-
tect information in their enforcement files, and have found that the Act should not be 
used to interfere with the law enforcement activities of administrative agencies. "The 
investigatory functions of the Agency may not be crippled by a requirement not com-
manded by the statute, certainly not by a requirement specifically exempted by the 
statute." Evans v. DOT, 446 F.2d 821, 824 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 
(1972). In Clement Bros. v. NLRB, 282 F. Supp. 540 (N.D. Ga. 1968), the court 
found that in addition to the legislative history, there is a "common sense necessity 
of protecting the invetigatory function." I d. at 542. 
75. Benson v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 1144 (D. Neb. 1970), found that: 
"The legislative history of this statute indicates that it is not the intent of the statute 
to hinder or in any way change the procedures involved in the enforcement of any law 
including 'files prepared in connection with related government litigation and adjudica-
tive proceedings."' ld. at 1146 (emphasis added). 
76. See, e.g., Nader, supra note 27, at 6; Sherwood, supra note 18, at 128. 
77. Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 939-40 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
400 u.s. 824 (1970). 
78. Katz, supra note 5, at 1279. 
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Informants' Privilege 
The one difficulty with this approach is the protection of in-
formants. Now here in the Act is there articulated an "informants' 
privilege." However, courts have interpreted the investigatory file 
exemption as protecting those who assist the government since identi-
fication of informants may interfere with law enforcement.79 The 
rationale behind the cases which apply the most restrictive readings of 
the investigatory file exemption has been the protection of informants. 80 
There is no reason that the two considerations cannot be sepa-
rated. Informants could be protected by a limited exemption and the 
rest of the file could be released when it ceases to be active. To 
accomplish this, courts need only focus on the purpose of the exemp-
tion to protect the law .enforcement function. They could release the 
file but protect information which would identify informants because 
release of the informant information would make citizens reluctant to 
inform and thereby severely impair government Jaw enforcementY 
Specific recognition of an informant privilege would lead to broader 
disclosure by limiting the "informant privilege" rationale to protec-
tion of informants only and not entire files. 
Criminal law enforcement files 
Another step which would open investigatory files would be to 
recognize the natural distinction between criminal investigatory files 
and civil files. The investigatory file exemption has been found not 
79. Evans v. DOT, 446 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972). 
80. This rationale has been explained as follows: 
For at least two reasons, of which Congress was undoubtedly aware, investiga-
tion files should be kept secret. The informant may not inform unless he knows 
that what he says is not available to private persons at their request, but more im-
portant in this day of increasing concern over the conflict between the citizen's 
right of privacy and the need of the Government to investigate it is unthinkable 
that rights of privacy should be jeopardized further by making investigatory files 
available to private persons. If these concerns are legitimate concerns, and I have 
no trouble in concluding that Congress regarded them as such, then at least a part 
of the purpose of enacting the investigatory file exemption is lost if the file ceases to 
be confidential as soon as the threat of a law enforcement proceeding disappears. 
Consequently, I hold that 'investigatory files compiled for law enforcement pur-
poses' need not be produced whether proceedings be contemplated or not. 
Cowles Communication, Inc. v. Department of Justice, 325 F. Supp. 726, 727 (N.D. 
Cal. 1971) (footnotes omitted). 
81. Informants may also be protected by exemption four. However, since no one 
knows what that exemption means (ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 16, 
at 300-03] it might be wiser to rely on the law relating to government investigatory 
files to protect informants. 
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to be limited to criminal investigation.82 This finding is supported by 
specific legislative statement. 83 
However, a more severe public policy rationale exists for the 
protection of criminal investigatory files. 84 Broader release of civil 
investigatory file information would be possible if a special interpre-
tation of the exemption, as applicable only to criminal investigatory 
files was established. Criminal law enforcement files could thereby be 
given a more restrictive exemption than civil enforcement files. 
Not only will this effect better protection for the government's 
criminal investigatory function, but it will protect the individual rights 
of those involved in criminal investigation. It is difficult to find any 
reason why the public should have access to the files compiled in the 
investigation of a possible individual criminal activity. 
The difference in policy considerations for the releasing of civil 
investigatory files and criminal investigatory files is so great that it 
was a mistake for Congress to consider them together in the first place, 
and it remains a mistake to continue to consider them together. 
Internal Memorandum Exemption 
Inter-agency or intra-agency documents are protected by exemp-
tion five. 85 This provision exempts any internal document "which 
would not be available by law to a party . . . in litigation with the 
agency." Thus the preliminary test is whether a party in any con-
ceivable context could discover the document. If not, then the docu-
ment is protected by exemption five. The phrase "which would not 
be available by law to a party" was intended to incorporate the 
traditional privileges applied to such documents. 86 The purposes of 
the exemption are to protect an agency's staff from operating in a 
"fish bowl," so that the staff will freely express their opinions, and 
to prevent the premature disclosure of agency decisions. 
The internal memoranda exemption has resulted in impractical 
ad hoc judicial interpretation. Although this exemption seems to be 
82. Clement Bros. v. NLRB, 282 F. Supp. 540, 542 (N.D. Ga. 1968). Barceloneta 
Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1967). 
83. H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 16, stated: "This exemption covers investiga-
tory files related to enforcement of all kinds of laws, labor and securities laws as well 
as criminal laws." Id. at 11. 
84. Black v. Sheraton Corp., 50 F.R.D. 130, 132 (D.D.C. 1970). 
85. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970) states: "This section does not apply to matters 
that are ... (5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not 
be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency." 
86. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 16, at 304. 
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a blanket exemption for internal papers, the courts have found occasion 
to attempt to limit its applicability. In Consumers Union v. Veterans 
Administration, 81 one court reasoned from the "available by law" 
phrase that an internal memorandum would be available under the 
Act if it were av,ailable through discovery under rule 26(b) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Consumers Union sought the 
results of hearing aid tests conducted by the Veterans Administra-
tion. The court, by superimposing upon the Act precedent developed 
under rule 26, found that the documents would ordinarily be made 
available under the Act. It relied on the traditional "government 
records" exception to discovery under rule 26. Government records 
had been held to be privileged where they were part of the "delibera-
tive process that must precede any well taken decision or policy state-
ment."88 The court relied on the cases decided before passage of the 
Act to find that the exception did not extend to factual documents. It 
transferred the "policy vs. factual" document distinctiGn to the fifth ex-
emption and held that the exemption did not extend to factual material.80 
The District of Columbia Circuit in Bristol-Myers v. FTC90 
went further and held that the exemption applied only to the opinion 
portions of internal documents and not to the entire document.91 The 
court followed this expansion of the "purely factual" doctrine in 
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission.92 Sterling in-
volved a request for documents relating to ,the Commission's investi-
gation of a merger which was similar to the one which Sterling was 
defending but which the Commission had ultimately approved. The 
court held that not only purely factual documents but also purely 
factual portions of policy documents must be released. Thus, under 
these two cases, agencies must attempt to edit "policy" documents so 
that the factual portions of an otherwise exempted document could 
be disclosed. 93 
87. 301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d 
Cir. 1971). 
88. Id. at 804. 
89. Id. at 805. 
90. 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970). 
91. After holding that portions of a document may be deleted to protect con-
fidential information, the court moved on to exemption five where it found "[a] 
similarly detailed analysis is necessary." 424 F.2d at 939. 
92. 450 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
93. Sterling recognized that a document might be so opiniated that a deletion 
approach would not be practical, but did not rule out the deletion approach in all 
instances. This can be seen in the court's answer to Sterling's contention that the 
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This holding is impracticable. The segregation of fact from 
opinion in individual memoranda cannot be done by lower level staff 
personnel. Hence, trained professionals must read every internal memo-
randum and edit out "purely factual" material. The mass of records 
which would require such treatment would require a large resource 
allocation, both by the agency and later by a reviewing court. 
Even as applied categorically to separate internal documents, the 
"purely factual" test places a significant burden on agencies. Request 
will not be limited to relevant discovery material as under rule 26, 
and hence, merely separating factual documents from policy documents 
will require professional staff to read and to segregate vast quantities 
of documents. 
It would be more consistent with the underlying goals of the Act 
if all internal memoranda were released after a certain period of time. 
A theory analogous to the "currently active" theory developing under 
the investigatory file exemption would be the most rational way to 
limit this exemption. The "premature disclosure" rationale is more 
firmly rooted under the internal memorandum exemption than under 
the investigatory file exemption.94 Internal memoranda could, based 
on the underlying theory of the exemption, lose their protection after 
they were no longer pertinent to a current decision.95 Courts should 
be no more reluctant to incorporate such a limitation than they are to 
lower court had not properly considered the possibility of deleting the opinion portions 
of the memorandum when it said: 
we must agree, however, that there is no indication in the opinion below that the 
judge considered the possibility of deleting portions of the documents. It may well 
be that making deletions would not change the character of these documents, since 
they appear to consist primarily of the thoughts and recommendations of the 
Commission and its staff. . . . We must therefore remand the case so that the 
District Court judge can consider this possibility and state in his opinion that he 
has done so. 
!d. at 704. The Sterling court cited Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.D.C. 1971), 
which held that: "Factual information may be protected only if it is inextricably 
intertwined with policy-making processes." 448 F.2d at 1077-78. However, the court 
in Soucie seemed to limit this holding to separate documents and not portions of docu-
ments, and hence, it seems that both Bristol-Myers and Sterling go beyond the holding 
of that case. 
94. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 16, at 304 states: "The 
above [legislative] quotations make it clear that the Congress did not intend to require 
the production of [internal memoranda] where premature disclosure would harm the 
authorized and appropriate purpose for which they are being used." (emphasis added). 
95. Documents involving national security would not be automatically released 
after a period of time but perhaps would be periodically subject to review. Epstein v. 
Resor, 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970). 
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release "purely factual" documents. Faced with such a limitation, 
agencies at least would be able to develop specialized internal rules 
for coping with it.96 
The nondisclosure of policy memoranda is supported by the 
desire to allow a free and frank exchange of ideas and to prevent 
bureaucrats from operating in a "fish bowl."97 However, this non-
disclosure rationale is contrary to .the disclosure bias of the Act. 
Moreover, the necessity for protection of all internal memoranda, 
either factual or opinion, is overstated. The rationale loses its vitality 
as time passes after the final determination for which the document 
was drafted is made. Furthermore, if the staffs of the agencies realized 
that some time in the future their work product would go on the 
public record, they would do a more careful, workmanlike job.98 If 
they knew that their work could be questioned in the future, even 
though the relevant decision was irrevocable, they would be more 
accurate and unbiased, and perhaps would avoid bowing to the special 
interests who, under the present system, would be the only ones likely 
to know their role in the decisionmaking. The decisionmaking process 
as a whole may benefit from criticism of the internal work product or 
the decisional process which resulted in an official decision. Staffs will 
continue to give agency officials their opinions because they must. 
The worst that can happen is that agency staff and agency officials 
would communicate orally more often; which may be a beneficial result 
from another point of view. 
In sum, the electorate would be better informed as to the factors 
behind a decision if all internal documents were subject to disclosure 
at some time. And agencies would find such a requirement workable 
96. One point worthy of mention is the oversight in the Act in not defining the 
term "agency" differently than it is used in the rest of the Administrative Procedure 
Act. Section 551 ( 1) excludes Congress from coverage of the AP A and state and local 
governments are excluded by lack of authority over their administrative procedure. 
For the purposes of the Act, particularly exemption five, congressional, state and local 
government communications with federal agencies should also be exempt but subject 
to ultimate release as prescribed. 
97. "Agency witnesses argued that a full and frank exchange of opinions would 
be impossible if all internal communications were made public. They contended, and 
with merit, that advice from staff assistants and the exchange of ideas among agency 
personnel would not be completely frank if they were forced to 'operate in a fishbowl.'" 
H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 16, at 10. The District of Columbia Circuit agreed: 
"In the Federal Establishment, as in General Motors or any other hierarchical giant, 
there are enough incentives as it is for playing it safe and listing with the wind; 
Congress clearly did not propose to add to them the threat of cross-examination in a 
public tribunal." Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
98. Tennessean Newspaper, Inc. v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657, 660-61 (6th Cir. 1972). 
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in contrast to the present "purely factual" limitation on the exemp-
tion. The problems of bureaucrats operating in a "fish bowl" are 
overstated. Thus, the limitation placed on the fifth exemption should 
be founded, not on the type of document, but on the current relevancy 
of the document to government policymaking.99 
Privileges 
The goal of providing readily available information cannot be 
permitted to steamrolllegitimate concern for the protection of informa-
tion obtained from outside the government which demands privileged 
treatment. Clear demarcation of privileged information is also a neces-
sary part of a public information system. 
In this regard, it is unfortunate that the most unfathomable pro-
vision of the Act is exemption four, relating to privileged and con-
fidential information.100 This exemption seems on its face to refer 
99. The internal memorandum exemption presently protects the most numerous 
types of law made by an agency - decisions not to prosecute or to take action. The 
decision not to act is rarely accompanied by an agency opinion, and hence, the most 
important decisions reached by agencies are given no background reasons. See K. 
DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JusTICE 103-06 (1969). In American Mail Lines, Ltd. v. 
Gulick, 411 F.2d 6% (D.C. Cir. 1969), the agency was required to disclose internal 
memoranda which were incorporated into a final determination by the agency. This 
opinion does not go far enough, and does not deal with instances where an agency 
makes a final determination, such as a decision not to proceed in an investigation, but 
does not incorporate a staff opinion. Where no agency opinion is adopted for any final 
agency action, all internal memoranda which were involved in that decision should be 
released to the public. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1971) 
(dissenting opinion). See also United States v. Leichtfuss, 331 F. Supp. 723 (N.D. 
Ill. 1971). The purpose of this is twofold : ( 1) It will encourage agencies to develop 
opinions in formal no-action situations and; (2) it will permit those affected by the 
agency decision some glimpse into the input for that decision. One should be cau-
tioned that, as the court in Sterling found, a released staff opinion may well confuse 
those outside the process as to what actually caused the agency to reach its final 
determination. Bearing this in mind, perhaps a more straightforward solution to this 
problem would be to require an opinion in every final agency action. 
100. Discussing exemption four, Davis stated: 
The Attorney General's Memorandum never acknowledges that the statutory 
words of the fourth exemption have a plain meaning. Instead, the Memorandum 
says that the words are 
. · . susceptible of several readings, none of which is entirely satisfactory. 
The exemption can be read, for example, as covering three kinds of matters : 
i.e., 'matters that are * * * [a] trade secrets and [b] commercial or financial 
information obtained from any person and [c] privileged or confidential.' 
Alternatively, clause [c] can be read as modifying clause [b]. Or, from a 
strictly grammatical standpoint, it could even be argued that all three clauses 
have to be satisfied for the exemption to apply. In view of the uncertain 
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only to documents of a commercial nature.101 The legislative history 
demonstrates that it was not to be so limited and was intended to 
include traditional privileges. 102 
Clearer articulation of what constitutes privileged information is 
necessary. The government has a duty to hold certain information in 
confidence, and this information should be carefully protected. More-
over, clear definition of privileged information will permit full use of 
clerical personnel to handle access. Although total cure for the Act's 
deficiencies in guarding confidential information can only be accom-
plished by amendment, courts must take cognizance of these deficiencies 
in releasing information. Courts must recognize that those who deal 
with the government do not lose their rights because they submit 
information to the government. 
Corporations 
There must be a distinction between the rights of an individual 
citizen and those of a corporation. Corporate rights to deal with the 
government in secret should be severely limited. Where information 
is obtained from a corporation, there seem to be very few instances 
where there will be reason to maintain its confidentiality. Trade secrets 
should not be disclosed by the government.103 Sensitive financial and 
commercial information obtained from a company under no statutory 
or administrative compulsion and with assurance of confidentiality 
explicitly given should be withheld from disclosure.104 
meaning of the statutory language, a detailed review of the legislative history 
of the provision is important. 
Especially fascinating is this sequence: The Attorney General ( 1) says the statute 
is susceptible of several readings, (2) he lists those readings, and ( 3) he then 
reaches a conclusion different from any he lists! If what he says implies that 
the statute is not susceptible of the reading he adopts, then I agree! Yet I am 
in basic sympathy with the Attorney General in all this because I fully agree 
with the fundamental idea that underlies what he says in the passage quoted -
that no reading of which the Act is susceptible can feasibly govern what the 
agencies will do. The fault is that of Congress, not that of the Attorney General. 
Davis, supra note 5, at 788. 
101. 5 U.S.C. § SS2(b) (1970) states: "This section does not apply to matters that 
are . . . ( 4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a 
person and privileged or confidential." 
102. "It would also include information customarily subject to the doctor-patient, 
lawyer-client, lender-borrower, and other such privileges." S. REP. No. 813, supra 
note 23, at 9. 
103. If the information is readily available through independent research then it is 
not a trade secret. Gellhorn, Business Secrets in Administrative Agency Adjudica-
tion, 22 AD. L. REv. SIS, 516 (1971). 
104. The Environmental Protection Agency has promulgated a rule to this effect. 
See 40 CFR § 2.107a(b) (1972). 
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Information Specifically Given in Confidence 
Information freely given with specific assurance by the govern-
ment that it will be kept in confidence should be exempt. In Tobacco 
Institute v. Federal Trade Commission/05 the court found that the 
controlling factor was whether confidentiality had been requested. The 
Tobacco Institute sought access to the answers to questionnaires sent 
to persons and organizations actively engaged or interested: in the 
subject of smoking and health. About half of those responding re-
quested confidential treatment. The court refused to order disclosure 
of those questionnaires which were received in confidence. 
The court in Nichols v. United States106 went so far as to hold 
that even where the information was not obtained by a specific grant 
of confidentiality the material would be protected if the assurance was 
given later. The case involved a request from a pathologist for 
material connected with the assassination of President Kennedy. The 
material was given to the government by the estate of President 
Kennedy without any request tha:t it be protected from public dis-
closure. Later the Kennedy family was asked if it wished confidential 
treatment and it responded affirmatively. Thus, at least in a sensitive 
fact situation, combined with an explicit request for confidentiality, 
courts will not require disclosure. Regardless of whether the informa-
tion was given on the assurance of confidential treatment or the 
expression was received after the information is in the possession of 
the government, it appears that courts will generally protect informa-
tion specifically given in confidence. 
Citizens' Privilege in Dealing With the Government 
The legislative history of the Act suggests that it is necessary to 
balance the disclosure requirement against the right of privacy.107 
Nevertheless a right should accrue to an individual citizen who must 
deal with the government that information he supplies will be used 
only for the purpose for which he supplied it and no other. Meticulous 
care should be taken to avoid any danger of staff discretion infringing 
on individual rights of privacy. Certain traditional privileges, such as 
doctor-patient and attorney-client, should be spelled out. But more 
importantly, a general privilege should be established for commum-
cation between the government and private individual - a govern-
ment-citizen privilege. 
105. Civil No. 3035-67 (D.D.C. April 11, 1968). 
106. 325 F. Supp. 130 (D. Kan. 1971), a/f'd, 460 F.Zd 671 (lOth Cir. 1972). 
107. S. REP. No. 813, supra note 23, at 7. 
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A new sensitivity to the protection of the individual privacy when 
dealing with the government has been emerging.108 At present, the 
Act does not afford this protection.109 Exemption four does not go 
far enough to assure privacy for those dealing with the government. 
Exemption six110 permits withholding personal and medical informa-
tion, but is severely limited by the phrase "clearly unwarranted in-
vasion of personal privacy."111 It is true that courts may hold that 
agencies are not required to release personal information.112 But the 
Getman v. N LRB113 decision severely limits this exemption and sug-
gests that minor invasions of privacy should give way to the public 
right to know. In that case, Getman, a law professor, attempted to 
gain access to the "Excelsior" lists of employees filed with the Board 
by employers.114 Since the list contained names and addresses of in-
dividual employees, the Board argued that release of the information 
would interfere with the privacy of the employees. The court sug-
gested that the employees' rights were not as important as the public 
interest value of the academic study. It found that legislative history 
indicated that only disclosure of intimate details was foreclosed. 115 
Balancing of this sort seems both unnecessary and unwarranted. 
The public does not have a need to know private information, and 
108. This new sensitivity is evidenced by the numerous bills to limit the sale or 
distribution of mailing lists by federal agencies. See, e.g., H.R. 327, 92d Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1971); H.R. 8903, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 9738, 92d Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1971); H.R. 10020, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). 
109. "In essence, [the Act] reverses the traditional presumption in favor of per-
sonal privacy and places the burden on the information-holding agency to find a specific 
statutory ground for refusing to honor a request for disclosure. In some instances the 
Act not only has shifted the burden of proof, it apparently has increased it as well." 
Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The, Challenge of a New Technology 
in an Information-Oriented Society, 67 MrcH. L. REv. 1089, 1194 (1969) (footnotes 
omitted). 
110. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970) states: "This section does not apply to matters 
that are ... ( 6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which 
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 
111. "The statute requires an invasion of personal privacy ... so long as it is not 
'clearly unwarranted.' The use of the word 'clearly' is a legitimate expression of a 
policy judgment, although one may wonder about its wisdom." Davis, supra note 5, 
at 798 (emphasis added) . 
112. Tuckinsky v. Selective Serv. Sys., 294 F. Supp. 803 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 418 
F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1969), held that a draft counsellor could not have personal informa-
tion about members of the selective service system and appeal board unless consent 
was given to release the information. 
113. 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
114. In accordance with a rule announced in Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 
N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966), employers must furnish the Board with a list of the names and 
addresses of all employees eligible to vote in an upcoming labor election. 
115. 450 F.2d at 674-75. 
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even if it did the individual has the right to have the information used 
for the purpose for which the government obtained it and for no 
other. He either has a right to privacy or does not, and no balancing 
is necessary. However, the Getman conclusion is correct in one sense; 
it is difficult to find protection within the Act, and information about 
an individual may well be freely available.116 
This situation is aggravated by the fact that there is no require-
ment that exempt material be protected by agencies. Thus, even 
exempt personal information will not be protected unless an agency 
wishes to protect itY7 In LaMorte v. M ansfieldP8 a witness in a 
Securities and Exchange Commission proceeding attempted to claim the 
investigatory file exemption for testimony given by him in an agency 
proceeding. Access was sought to the testimony in connection with a 
litigation in which he was a defendant. The court held that a private 
individual could not claim an exemption granted an agency under the 
Act. Therefore, the private individual has no more protection than an 
agency wishes to afford him even with respect to exempt material. 
An unambiguous exemption for personal privacy should be estab-
lished to cover any information supplied to the government by an 
individual citizen, and application of the exemption by the agency 
should be mandatory. A private individual should be protected from 
the harassment which may emanate from the release of personal in-
formation by the government. Bureaucrats should not be permitted 
any latitude in releasing private information.119 
III. MoRE AMBITIOus MoDIFICATIONS 
Despite the possible adjustments through judicial interpretations 
which have been suggested above, the undeniable truth is that the Act 
is not well suited for the task of providing public information. Judicial 
legislation may provide a partial remedy if the courts begin to take a 
pragmatic approach to providing public information. But if easily and 
quickly obtainable information is to be supplied to the public, adminis-
trative or legislative innovations must be forthcoming. Two innova-
tions are appropriate. First, active administrative enforcement must 
replace passive judicial enforcement. Second, greater efforts must be 
made to make everything not exempt available for public inspection 
and copying. 
116. But cf. Giannella, supra note 5, at 219. 
117. See Miller, supra note 109, at 1195-96. 
118. 438 F.Zd 448 (2d Cir. 1971). 
119. Miller, supra note 109, at 1199. 
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Administrative Enforcement 
Judicial enforcement in a public information system has not been 
effective. 120 The courts are not equipped to handle this problem. They 
can only sit passively and wa:it for cases to come to them. Thus, 
judicial enforcement has not provided most citizens with the benefits 
of the Act. 121 Courts cannot provide the leadership and supervision 
required for a comprehensive public information system.122 Indeed, 
judicial enforcement is not only inadequate, but also aggravates the 
problem by increasing delay. Judicial enforcement is also made in-
advisable by the overwhelming burden it places on the already over-
burdened courts. 
A recommendation made in 1940 by .the Attorney General's 
Committee on Administrative Procedure may provide the type of 
enforcement necessary for a viable public information system. The 
Committee recommended the creation of a Director of Administra-
tive Procedure - an administrative agency to oversee administrative 
agencies. 123 One of the Proposed tasks of the Director was that of 
policing the public information policies of the various agencies. 124 In 
the area of public information, this idea has even greater value today 
than it did in the 1940's, because judicial enforcement has been given 
a test and has failed. 
Government information will be made generally available only 
if an executive entity is vested with sole responsibility for making it 
available. A public information agency must be established that will 
assume an active role. It must act both as an inspector general 
policing agencies' information policy - and as an ombudsman -
dealing with complaints through administrative procedures. 
The Justice Department has set up "The Freedom of Informa-
tion Committee" which reviews agency denials of access from the point 
of view of defending the denial in court.125 There is no doubt that 
this group does a great deal to loosen the access policies of the agencies. 
But it is passive in approach, and tends to weigh success in the courts 
and resource allocation of trial staff more .than it does the policy of 
120. Giannella, supra note 5, at 225. 
121. Nader, supra note 27, at 2. 
122. Courts also are unable to cure deficiencies in agencies' staff work. Giannella, 
supra note 5. at 225; Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Gardner, 381 F.Zd 271, 282 (D.C. 
Cir. 1967) stated: "The courts sit to assure substantial fairness, not to discipline 
agencies for awkwardness in their staff work." 
123. ATTORNEY GENERAL's REPORT, supra note 7, at 123-26 - This proposal is a 
touch of genius and continues to be a worthwhile proposal. 
124. Proposed Bill, § 7, ATTORNEY GENERAL's REPORT, supra note 7, at 194. 
125. H.R. REP. No. 92-1419, supra note 33, at 66-69. 
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freeing access to information. The experience of this body does demon-
strate, however, that an oversight group will assist in releasing in-
formation and that such an organization could be created by the 
executive without further resort to Congress.126 
Public Inspection 
The present scheme for obtaining access to government informa-
tion consists of a request, with varying degrees of specificity, adminis-
trative search and determination, and often judicial review, before 
access is granted. This procedure cannot provide free and fast in-
formation. Most of the six common complaints with respect to the 
implementation of the Act found by the Administrative Conference127 
can be attributed to the technique established by the Act for releas-
ing information. 
The inherent defects in the system of the Act cannot be over-
come merely by developing guidelines that a clerk can follow. The 
information which is to be made available must be made available 
quickly and in a useful manner. There will be no free and fast public 
information until the available records can simply be pulled off a shelf 
upon a request to clerical personnel. 
All nonexempt documents should be available for public inspec-
tion at a convenient location. 128 All agencies have public record rooms 
where certain documents are available "across the counter." Records 
available under this procedure need only be expanded to include all 
information to which access is required under the Act. Because screen-
ing and segregating of the documents will be done beforehand, no 
cumbersome administrative determinations or clerical decisions will 
be required. 
In implementing this policy, it would be desirable to establish an 
official in each agency whose duty it is to make information available. 
Anything that is developed in a final form within the agency -
excluding current internal memoranda and material in a working 
126. "This committee also is convinced that the FOI Committee and the Office 
of Legal Counsel [of the Department of Justice] could - and should - exercise 
more of a leadership and coordinating function to improve the administrative machinery 
as well as to foster a more positive attitude in the Federal bureaucracy toward the 
basic principles and goals of the FOI Act." Id. at 68. 
127. These were: (1) equality of access; (2) evasive and obstructive practices -
overly formal requirement; (3) delay; (4) commingling of exempt and nonexempt 
information; (5) resistance to disclosure by lower level staff; and (6) lack of uni-
form fee for locating and copying. Giannella, supra note 5, at 221-25. 
128. See Nader, supra note 27, at IS. 
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investigatory file129 - should pass through this official before they 
are included in a permanent file. This official should be responsible 
for setting up the procedure. He and his staff should review all these 
records. If the material does not come under an exemption, then it 
should be indexed and placed on public display. If it does come with-
in an exemption, and a decision is made to withhold it, then it should 
be described in an index and reasons given for withholding. 
This procedure will permit the media the quick access which they 
require. It will permit researchers the latitude to make searching ex-
peditions in agencies' records using primarily their own resources and 
only a small amount of the agencies' resources. Most importantly, this 
procedure will provide access indistinguishably as to interest involved.130 
This procedure will also solve one problem which unsuccessful 
applicants now face. At present, there is no immediate requirement 
that withheld information be identified or reasons given for denial. 
Documents are withheld without the requesting party knowing what 
he has not seen or why he has not seen it. 
This method of disclosure would take advantage of the fact that 
those inside an agency understand the records and can organize and 
compile the information in a useable form. 131 It is vital that informa-
tion be well organized and retrievable, and only agency personnel can 
successfully manage the records. 
It is also hoped this procedure will change the attitude of the 
agencies' staff towards disclosure. At present, it is easier to withhold 
documents than to release them, and hence agency personnel find that 
to deny access is in their own best interest. 132 It is predicted that 
imposing a greater burden for withholding documents, while making 
it relatively easy to release them, will do much to encourage release.133 
As the Senate Report said, "[f] or the great majority of different 
records, the public as a whole has a right to know what its Govern-
129. These would, of course, be placed in the process for release immediately upon 
loss of "current" status. 
130. APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 8, at 198 states: "The section [section 
3] has been drawn upon the theory that administrative operations and procedures are 
public property which the general public, rather than a few specialists or lobbyists, is en-
titled to know or to have the ready means of knowing with definiteness and assurance." 
131. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 7, at 26. 
132. See Giannella, supra note 5, at 224. 
133. Statement of John R. Quarles, Jr., Assistant Administrator for Enforcement 
and General Counsel, Environmental Protection Agency, 1972 Hearings, supra note 34, 
at 1877: "Thus, staff personnel must go to some trouble to deny a reques't, while 
granting a request is less troublesome since high-level clearance is not needed. We 
hope and expect that this procedure will encourage staff personnel to respond promptly 
and affirmatively to requests for information." 
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ment is doing.m34 When motivated away from seeing danger in 
every exposure, agencies will find that most documents can be made 
public as a matter of course without doing injury to their function. 
The Administrative Conference considered greater use of public 
inspection and rejected that approach. It suggested that use of that 
approach would result in mechanical insertion of material into closed 
files rather than true exercise of agency discretion.135 However, this 
result does not necessarily follow from a public inspection system. 
First, if the agencies honestly try to comply with the Act, very little 
information will not be made public, assuming that the recommenda-
tions earlier made as to investigatory files and internal memoranda 
are implemented. Second, there is no reason an agency cannot exer-
cise its discretion in special cases under a public inspection procedure. 
Indeed, the index of withheld documents will facilitate special requests 
for nonpublic information. 
The agencies generally resist giving specific reasons for with-
holding documents,l36 but the reasons will facilitate the auditing and 
enforcement of the Act. Moreover, as mentioned above, the extra 
burden of giving reasons for withholding each document will provide 
incentive to resist the temptation to withhold questionable documents. 
To universally accomplish this policy will require congressional 
or executive action. However, there are examples of judicial orders 
requiring agencies to grant public inspection of nonexempt material 
and to index material which cannot be disclosed. 
In Irons v. SchwylerP7 the applicant sought all the unpublished 
manuscript opinions of the Patent Office. The court found that the 
request was so broad as to be burdensome since the opinions contained 
some information which would be protected by the Act and release 
would require unreasonable effort to segregate disclosable material. 
Although it refused to order the agency to disclose the information, it 
did require indexing in compliance with§ 552(a)(2)(c).138 This 
section is limited to matters formally considered by the agency and 
cannot be read to extend to all records required by the Act to be dis-
closed. However, the rationale of Irons is worth noting. The court 
held that it could not require disclosure under so broad a request but 
134. S. REP. No. 813, supra note 23, at 5. 
135. Giannella, supra note 5, at 242-43. 
136. !d. at 255. 
137. 321 F. Supp. 628 (D.D.C. 1970). 
138. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2) (C) (1970) states " ... Each Agency also shall main-
tain and make available for public inspection and copying a current index providing 
identifying information for the public as to any matter issued, adopted, or promulgated 
after July 4, 1967, and required by this paragraph to be made available or published." 
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ordered the agency to index the documents so a reasonable request 
could be fashioned. An index of documents which are in the possession 
of the agency, but not to be released, permits everyone - the request-
ing party, the courts, and probably the agency itself - to focus any 
controversy on information actually available. Indexing should be 
considered by courts more frequently when they are faced with ques-
tions of overly broad requests rather than upholding denial of access 
or putting the agency to an impossible burden. 
In United States v. Leichtfuss/39 the applicant requested access 
to Selective Service directives and manuals. The court found that the 
documents should have been made available under the Act. But the 
court went further, and found that the applicant and others like him 
should not be required to file a formal request under the Act each 
time disclosure of the documents was desired. It found that such a 
procedure would serve no purpose; in addition it would burden the 
agency and the applicant, and would inject unnecessary delay into 
the granting of access to documents already designated for release. 
Therefore, the court ordered the records to be made available in a 
convenient place for anyone to inspect and copy. Courts could so order 
where the same information is likely to be requested repeatedly. 
Realistically, easily and quickly obtainable public information can 
only result from a major modification in the public information system. 
An administrative agency assigned to enforce the Act is the only 
means which will assure adequate enforcement and active leadership 
in implementing a public information system. Only an "over the 
counter" access system will make information realistically available 
to all users. 
IV. CoNCLUSION 
The problems inherent in the effort to achieve fair and effective 
administration of a public information policy transcend the needs of 
individual applicants. These problems must be considered within the 
broad spectrum of the administrative process. Unfortunately, Congress 
did not write a statute which lends itself easily to efficient implementa-
tion of a freedom of information system within the total administrative 
process. Moreover, the courts have followed a rather narrow and 
myopic approach to implementing the Act. 140 
139. 331 F. Supp. 723 (N.D. Ill. 1971). 
140. Recently, the Supreme Court in Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 
41 U.S.L.W. 4201 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1973) made an effort to rationalize the judicial 
approach to implementation of the Act. Although the major portion of the opinion 
relates to exemption one [see note 54 supra and accompanying text] its most interest-
ing aspect is its approach to judicial scrutiny under exemption five. In direct conflict 
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The inherent deficiencies of the Act and the unrealistic decisions 
of the judiciary have resulted in continual criticism of the agencies. 
Although bureaucrats have not been overly enthusiastic in complying 
with the Act, it seems somewhat unfair to focus all adverse comment 
on them. Indeed, many agencies have labored diligently to carry out 
the congressional mandate as they see it. Moreover, one should not 
underestimate the effects of the guerilla activities of "public interest" 
bureaucrats. 
This article has suggested that the task for the courts and the 
critics of the present public information system is to modify the 
approach of the Act and the information system in general in order 
to make it possible to realistically expect a free and fast flow of in-
formation from the federal government. The suggested interpreta-
tions of the Act attempt to indicate methods for avoiding the present 
ad hoc approach and for incorporating into decisions considerations 
of the practical difficulties in making records available. The suggested 
interpretations, while recognizing the burden on the agencies, are not 
intended to provide less access, and are indeed intended ultimately to 
provide more disclosure of agencies' records. Suggested also are 
modifications beyond the authority of the judiciary but within easy 
reach of others. These too represent an attempt to build workability 
into the public information system so that more information can rea-
sonably be made available. 
The constant flailings of those dissatisfied with implementation of 
the Act cannot produce any positive change and can only result in 
continued use of a frustrating and basically faulty system. It is simply 
time we moved off center and approached the problems of a public 
information system rationally. 
with the trend of circuit court decisions, the Court held that "in camera inspection 
of all documents is not a necessary or inevitable tool in every case." ld. at 4207. 
Thus, an agency by various means short of submission of all the documents may be 
able to show to a court's satisfaction that it has complied with the Act. For instance, 
an agency may by affidavit or oral testimony demonstrate that the "surrounding cir-
cumstances" support a finding that the withheld documents are "advisory" and 
contain no severable "purely factual" material or that the edited versions it volun-
tarily released contain the entire disclosable portion of the documents. The Court 
also sanctioned in camera inspection of a representative document only. This holding 
will absolve the district courts from performing many of the largely clerical functions 
previously required of them. It constitutes a clear recognition that methods utilized 
by courts in handling traditional discovery are not practical in reviewing access 
questions under the Act. 
